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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

1\'IILDRED D. DUBOIS,

P lainti ff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12820

F. RAY DUlJOIS, JH.,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEl\J:F~NT

OF J'ACTS

Hespornle11t's Statement of I~,acts is unacceptable
in se,·eral particulars. First, respondent has insisted on
helahori11g the point that she had grounds for divorce
something which was conceded at trial by appellant (R.
13:3) *, ancl which is not, in fact, at issue in anyway in
this appeal. Respondent's obsession with the question of
fault does, howe,·er, reinforce appellant's argument, in
Point V of his brief', that the trial court's award, when
viewed as a whole, manifests an intent on the court's part
to unlawfully punish appellant.
*Note: R refers to the pagination of the Record.
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Secondly, respondent's statement of facts deals at
some length with her exhibits 2-P and 3-P, the introcluetion of which into e''idence was objected to by a1}
pellant on the ground that they were base<l upon respondent's theory that the husband is the Trustee of the
marital estate. (R. 99, 111-112, and 123). l\Ioreover,
respondent admitted at that time that these exhibits
were based upon that theory and that that was the theory
upon which she was proceeding. (R. 111-114). Appel·
lant, however, in Point II of his brief clearly establishes
that this theory is repugnant to Utah law and respondent
does not appear to contest this fact in her brief. In view
of this, respondent's continued reliance upon these ex·
hibits is strange indeed.
Finally, respondent, in her statement of facts, ad·
mits that appellant contributed in excess of $500.000.00
hy way of earned income to the marital estate. She then
proceeds to take this minimum figure as the absolute
total of appellant's income, and, having divided it by
the twenty-nine years of the parties' marriage, states
that this amounts to only an average of $17,241.00 per
year. Hespondent goes on to assert that it would have
been impossible on such an income for appellant to build
a marital estate with a value in excess of $570,000.00
without the gifts to respondent from her family. 'Vhat
respondent neglects to mention is that her family's gifts
to her over the twenty-nine years in question totalled
only $117,509.00, which amounts to only an average
co;tribution per year of $4,052.03. \Ve submit that it
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woulcl haYe been patently impossible for the parties to
haYe accumulated a marital estate with a vlaue in excess
of *570,000.00 but for appellant's contribution of earned
income to the marital estate of over $17,241.00 per year.

The following Argument is in the same order as
the Argument in the briefs that have already been submitted in this matter.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
Contrary to respondent's assertions, this Court in
MacDonald v. 1ll acDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066
( 1951) clearly held that it was proper for the trial court
to take into consideration in adjusting the parties' property rights both the inheritance which the wife had received from her father subsequent to the development
of the marital difficulties between the parties but prior
to the initiation of the divorce proceedings, and the expectancy which she had in the estate of her sick, aged
mother. 120 Utah at 578 and 582-83. The parties in the
M ad)onald case had been married for twenty-nine years
at the time of the divorce. During the course of their
marriage the wife had developed a significant drinking
problem. Finally the husband sued for divorce claim.'
ing as grounds therefore that his wife had been habitually drunk for the preceding four years. At trial, the
court so found, and awarded the divorce to the husband.
'rhe court, however, awarded the wife almost all of the
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property in the marital estate, plus attorney's fees and
$10.00 per year alimony. l~O Utah at 576-77. The wife
appealed claiming that the Court had committed reversible error by not awarding her substantial alimony,
120 Utah at ;378. In the Supreme Courfs view, this was,
"one of those cases where the marriage had so
far deterioratecl that there was nothing ... to
do except to recognize the failure . . . 'pronounce a benediction on the wreck'; [and] proceed to make the best arrangement of the
property and income of the parties so that they
could reaclj ust their lives to the new situation
as well as possible." 120 Utah at 577.
The Court then noted that,
"The assets posse~secl hy the parties were as
follows: Their home, valued at $1:3,000, less
a $6,000 mortgage, net value $7,000; household furniture and equipment valued at $2,000;
1949 Hudson automobile value at $1,400, less
a lien of $121; a bank account of $6,948.25 in
defendant'.-; name-u:.:hich 'UHtS the balance of
an inheritance of $8,000 u:hich she had rcceil'cd
in 19;30. Def end ant also has an e,rpectancy in
the estate of her mother who was 82 year.r; of
age at the time of the trial. The plaintiff has
been employed by the Chicago, l\Iilwaukce, St.
Paul & Pacific Railroad Company at a good
salary for many years; he is at present general
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agent for the company at Salt Lake City at
a gross salary of $481.80 per month, or a net
of $1387.IJG after all deductions." 120 Utah at
578. (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court af firmcd the trial court's
award of almost all of these rather modest assets to the
wife. The Court's primary concern in this regard was
the fact that the ";ife, although responsible for the divorce, was unable, due to her alcoholism, to secure and
hold a paying job, a fact which was conceded to be true
by all parties to the action. 120 Utah at 580.
The Court then considered the wife's claim that
the rather modest assets awarded her by the trial court
were insufficient to properly maintain her and that she
was entitled, in addition, to a substantial alimony award.
ln the Court's view the proper method to follow in this
eotmection was to evaluate the facts of the case before
it in the light of the fifteen points set forth by Chief
J usticc \ Volfe in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P .2d
2G;J ( 19137). Point nine of these fifteen points inquires
into how the parties acquired the property contamed in
the marital estate. The Court answered this point by
noting that all of the property had been acquired via
the husband's efforts except for three hundred dollars
($aoo.oo) which she had put into the house and the six
thousand nine hundred dollars ( $6,900.00) which she
inherited from her father. 120 Utah at 581. The Court
later summarized the importance of this factor in de-
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temining whether the wife should receive alimony as
follows:
"The court awar<le<l her much the larger share
of the family assets, and in view of the fact
that she had $G,900 in cash immediately available, saw no necessity to decree that she be pai<l
substantial alimony immediately. True, this
cash is hers, but it 'leas properly tali:en into acu111t in appraising the entire financial situ.al 11111 of' the parties and adjusting their property
rights." (Emphasis added) 120 Utah at 582.
1 •

Point fourteen of the fifteen points set forth in
the Pinion decision asks if there was, "[a]ny extra·
ordinary sacrifice, devotion or care ·which may have been
given to the spouse or others . . . and obligations to
other dependents having a secondary right to support."
120 Utah at 582. The Court answered this bv stating
that,
"This factor is not important here, hut the
converse of it is, She should not be required to
look at her mother for support but the definite
c,rpectaucy in her 82 year old mother's estate is
something 'lohich 11W/J well be kept in rnind as
a future conti11gc11clJ." (Emphasis added) 120
Utah at 582.
The Court thus clearly and unequivocally held that an
important factor that must be considered by the tiial
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court m order to accomplish a fair and equitable division of the property in the marital estate is the existence
of contingent future interests that may redound to the
benefit of one of the parties. In the instant case, the
e\'i(lence indicates that respondent will be the sole beneficiary of her sick and aged mother's estate, the value
of which was estimated at trial to be between One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) and Two
Hull<lrecl Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00). The trial
eomt did not, however, in either its memorandum opinion or its l<'irnlings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
mention or even allude to respondent's expectancy in
her mother's estate. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the
trial comt specifically awarded respondent the entire
inheritance which she received from Dr. Hirth. In view
of these facts and the size of the marital estate ( approximately $;j70,000.00) and the sources of the property contained therein (over $500,000.00 in earned income from appellant versus approximately $117,000.00
which respondent receiYed in gifts from her family), it
is cr~·stal clear that the trial court committed reyersible
error and grossly abused its discretion by awarding respondent sixty percent of the marital estate.
Respornlent has attempted to distinguish llfichelsen
Z'. Jlicliclsc11, 14 Utah 2d 328, 383 P.2d 893 (1963),
which was cited in appellant's brief as being in accord
with the Court's decision in l.llacDonald, by noting
simply, as the Supreme Court did, in its opinion, that
the trial court had "discussed" the inheritance which
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the wife had received from her father in its second memorandum decision. The fact the Court clismisse<l the
husband's assertions on that ground, clearly supports
appellant's contention that inheritances that vest in a
party prior to the divorce must be considered by the
trial court when it adjusts the financial affairs of the
parties. The fact that the Court did not disturb the trial
court's award in that case does not in any way lend sup·
port to respondent's position for, unlike the jnstant case,
the total assets contained in the marital estate, including the wife's inheritance, amounted to only $70,000.00.
Considering the wife's age, her lack of employment and
the si,.;e of the marital estate it does not seem surprising
that the Court affirmed the division of the assets and
the $275.00 per month in alimony decreed by the trial
court.
Respondent has attempted to distin~111ish 1Voolley
t'. 1Voollcy, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948), which
held that the spouse in that case should he allowed to
participate in any appreciation which might occur in
some speculative mining properties which the trial comt
had awarded to the husband, by stating that the case
did not i1wolve an inheritance, vested or otherwise. That
is true, hut the case does stand for the proposition that
future contingencies must be considered by the trial
court in its adjustment of the financial affairs of the
parties, the very point that is in issue in the instant case.
Finally, respondent claims that the 111 acDonalil
case cannot mean what it clearly says for if it does it
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"wo11 lcl balloon the whole discord of the marital rela-

tionship out of any semblance of perspective." (Respornle11t's hrief at page 17). Respondent's adoption
of this "horrible consequences" argument is interesting
in three respects. First, it is a specious argument in that
the holding in 1llacD011ald is clearly limited by the facts
of that case to situations where a significant sum of
money will devolve upon a party in the not too distant
future by the occurrence of an unavoidable event. Seconclly, respondent argues that such a rule would force
the parties to engage in interminable and exhaustive
discovery. This hardly seems likely, however, since it
must he remembered that the parties to a divorce action
hwe heen rnarriecl for some period of time and are in
all probability quite familiar with the financial affairs
of their spouse's family. :l\loreover, even if some slight
inereasc in discovery is required, and the Utah cases as
well as the cases from other jurisdictions (see appellant's hrief at pages 6-7) that employ this rule do not
reflect any such increase, this seems a small price to
pay for a more equitable resolution of the partie-,' financial af f'airs. Finally, it must be noted that respondent's
adherence to this ar6rument is particularly interesting
in view of her apparent obsession both at trial and on
appeal with the question of fault, something that was
conceclecl at trial and which is not at issue on this appeal,
for it clearly appears that respondent has attempted
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to "balloon" this issue "out of any semblance of perspective." As the Court in 11[aclJonald noted:
"Great caution is necessary to prevent the contentions and strife which frequently exist in
contested divorce cases from distorting the
judgment by placing extraordinary emphasis
on particular instances of blameworthy conduct
or some unusual sacrifice or contribtuion in
some one phase of the over-all picture.'' 120
Utah at 580.

POINT II
Respondent has asserted in her brief that the trial
court in chambers and off the record rejected her "trust"
theory of the marital estate. The universally recognized
rule is that the record which is certified to the appellate
court controls that court's determination of the issues
presented in the appeal. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and

Error § 48(). The application of this rule to the instant
case would appear to be particularly appropriate because
it is manifestly clear from a review of the record before
the Court (see particularly R. 35-36, 99, 111-113 and
123) and the trial court's award, that the triaJ court
based its division of the marital estate upon respondent's
trust theory.

I~'inally, respondent has attempted to distinguish
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A 11dcr.w11 v. A ndcrson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192
( HHi7), from the facts of the case at bar. A comparison
of the facts of that case with the facts in the instant
case reveals, however, that the trust theory that respornlent proffered at trial (see R. 111-114) is identieal in all material respects with the theory that the Supreme Court of Utah unequivocally rejected in the
A ndcr.~on case. Since, as indicated above, the record reveals that the trial court adopted the theory in question
as the basis of its division of the marital estate, it is
dear that the trial court committed reversible error.

POINT III
Respondent in her statement of facts states that
appella11t's annual salary at the time of his termination
from Lee's was $22,000.00 per year and that his average income over the course of the parties' marriage
was only $17,241.00 per year. As noted in appellant's
hrief, respornlent's total assets of $422,044.00, composed
of the $:J47,044<.00 awarded her out of the marital estate
an<l the $75,000.00 she received from Dr. Hirth, which
the court awarded her as her separate property, should
produce approximately $30,000.00 per year in income
if invested at an average annual return of seven per
cent. In view of these facts, it is difficult to see how
respondent can in good faith and good conscience argue
that in addition to this investment income of $30,000.00
per year she is entitled to alimony of four thousand five
hundred dollars $4500.00) per year. This would seem
pa1ticnlarly true in view of the fact that respondent
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apparcntl~· docs not deny that an alimony awar<l

"measure(! by the wife's reasonable needs and requir
men ts considering her condition arnl station in Ii fe ...
"Opens/um: t'. Opc11slta1c, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364, Ile
( 1932). Consequently, it is clear from the absence c
any e\·idence in the record as to what respondent's nee(
are, that the trial court's award of alimony to responder
was manifestly unjust, inequitable and unwarrante
both by the facts arnl the equities of this case.

POINT IV

Contrary to respondent's assertions m her brieJ
Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681
()87 (1951) an(l JVciss 1:'. JVciss, 111 Utah !3;3:l, 361136
and 364 17f> P.2d 1005 ( 1945) clearly and plainly hol1
that "necessity" is the primary criterion by which th
trial court must he guided in making an award of at
torney fees. The four cases cited hy respondent in sup
port of her position do not hold otherwise and each o
them is in fact irrelevant to the issue raised on this ap
peal. In Gardner 1:'. Gardner, 118 Utah 4!_)(3, 222 P.2(
l 055 ( 1950), for example, the trial court awarded th1
wife $150.00 in attorney's fees. The husband appeale1
claiming solely that the court was precluded from mak
irw
such an award because his former wife had failed tc
b
specifieally ask for such relief in her pleadings. Thi
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award hold
ing that the wife's prayer for general relief was suffi.
cient, and that the facts which she alleged in her com-
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plaint an<l later proved at trial entitled her to the fees
awarded. 222 P. 2d at 1058.
In Butler 'l.'. Butler, 23 Utah 2d 259, 461 P. 2d
7'27 ( 1H69), also cited by respondent, the trial court
awanlecl the former wife $600.00 in attorney fees in a
post divorce action brought by her former husband to
have her held in contempt for refusing to comply with
the child custody provisions of the divorce decree. The
husband a ppealecl claiming that there was no evidence
in the record to support the court's award. The Supreme
Court agreed and reversed. 461 P. 2d at 728-29.

Stuber 'l.'. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 24 !! P. 2d 650
( 1!);)()) is also completely in accord with the JJT eiss and
,,J lldrtdgc decisions. In the Stuber case the ex-wife
brought suit against her ex-husband to force him to
compl~r with trial court's decree which had awarded the
custody of the parties' only child to her. The trial court
affirmed its earlier award and ordered the defendant
to deliver the child forthwith to the plaintiff. In addition, the court ordered him to pay his ex-wife an attorney's fee in the amount of $100.00. The evidence in
regards to the attorney's fees showed that the husband's
net monthly income was almost three times as large as
the wife's. llased on this evidence the Supreme Court
affirrnecl the trial court's award, obviously concluding
that a sufficient showing of need had been made by the
wife. 244 P. 2d at 653. In the instant case, the respondent's assets and income as awarded by the trial court
1
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are almost twice as large as appellant's, and consequently the ,~'tuber case can hardly be said to be authority for
the trial court's award in the instant action.
Finally, the respondent cites Sorensen v. Sorensen,
14 Utah 2d 24, 376 P. 2d 547 ( 1963), which is, however, completely irrelevant to the issue raised in this
appeal. In the Sorensen case the wife was awarded attorney's fees in an amount not revealed in the Supreme
Court's opinion. The husband unsuccessfully appealed
this award claiming solely that the award was excessive.
No issue as to the necessity of the award was raised by
the husband and consequently that case has no precedential value in the instant situation.
POINT V
As appellant established in his brief, under this
Point V, the trial court's actions when viewed as a whole
manifest an unlawful intent on the court's part to pun·
ish appellant. Respondent has replied to this hy argu·
ing that it is legitimate for the court to consider the
relative degrees of fault of the parties. This is ~ rather
interesting position for respondent to adopt since it
seems to impliedly admit that the court's actions were
in fact punitfre and inequitable. :Moreover, respondent
has not attempted to reveal how the court's actions could
be considered to be fair and equitable, and this is not
surprising since it is clear that they were not.
Respondent, has also argued the court's award in
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the instant case is not punitive because the Supreme
Court in JVil.Yun v. JVilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977
( l!l5G), affirmed the trial court's award of substantially
all of the property in the marital estate to the wife.
What respondent fails to reveal is that the total value
of the marital estate in that case was only $17,681.65.
2DG P. 2cl at 978-79. In view of the size of the estate
arnl the fact that th~ wife established "that she ... [was]
in poor health; that she ... [had] been under doctor's
care; that she ... [was] not presently capable of working ancl ... [had] no special training or skill with which
to maintain herself," 296 P. 2d at 980, it is not surprising that this Court affirmed the trial court's division
of the marital estate. J\Ioreover, it should be noted that
this Court then went on to reduce the trial court's award
of alimony by 50%, on the ground that it, when it was
reviewed in the light of the court's property award, constituted a clear abuse of discretion and was manifestly
unjust. 296 P. 2d at 980. It is submitted that the trial
court's awards in the instant case likewise represent a
clear abuse of discretion and are manifestly unjust to
appellant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set
forth in appellant's brief, it is respectfully requested
that the Court set aside the property, alimony and attorney's fees, awards of the trial court and exercise the
authority which it has in a divorce action to review the
record de novo, Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 84,

16
206 P. 2d 077 (1n;36); and 1Virse 'I:'. TVic.~c. 24 Utah2d
236, 238, 46!) P. 2d ;304 ( l H70), hy decreeing its own

judgment denying respondent alimony and attomey
fees, ordering the inclusion of respondent's inheritance
from Dr. Hirth in the marital estate, awarding appel·
lant $340,Hl 1.00 of that estate which would then be
Yalued at $656,Hl 1.00 (utilizing $75,000.00 as the value
of respondent's inheritance from Dr. I-Iirth) and award·
ing respondent the remai11<ler, which would come to
$307,000.00. In the alternati,·e, appellant requests that
the judgment of the district court be re\'erse<l in all
particulars other than its award of a divorce to respon·
dent and that the cause he remanded with directions to
eliminate the awards of alimony and attorney fees, to
recalculate the value of the marital estate and to dis·
tribute it in accordance with the directions of this Court.

DATED this ........ day of ............................ , 1972.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT. BAGLEY, CORN1VALL
& l\IcCAR'l'II Y
Clifford L. Ashton
Ray G ..Martineau
.AttornclJS for Defendant-Appellant
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